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BAILEY D. and BERKELEY N. Regional responses to recession: the role of theWest Midlands Regional Taskforce, Regional Studies.
Regional taskforces were set up across the English regions in late 2008 in response to the most severe recession since the Second
World War. This paper examines the role of one such body, the West Midlands Regional Taskforce, as an example of regional
response to recession, and offers potential lessons for the future in dealing with such situations. In so doing it reﬂects on the
contested concept of regional ‘resilience’ and its relevance for policy actions at the regional level. Understanding how the
region responded in this way could help in maintaining a ‘permanent capacity’ to deal with shocks, especially in the context
of the abolition of regional development agencies (RDAs) in England from 2012 and their replacement with local enterprise
partnerships (LEPs).
English regions Regional development agencies Recession responses Regional resilience Local enterprise partner-
ships Localism
BAILEY D. and BERKELEY N. 经济衰退的区域回应：英格兰中西部区域专门小组的角色，区域研究。2008年底，英格
兰各区域纷纷成立了区域专门小组，以因应第二次世界大战以来最为严峻的经济衰退。本文检视其中一个专门小组
的角色，即英格兰中西部区域专门小组，做为区域回应经济衰退的案例，并提供未来因应此般情势的可能经验教
训。藉此，本文考量区域“恢復力”的竞争性概念，及其之于区域层级政策行动的关联性。理解区域为何以此方式
做出回应，有助于维持应对冲击的“永久能力”，特别是在英格兰自2012年废止区域发展署（RDAs），并由地方企业
伙伴（LEPs）取代之后的脉络中。
英格兰的区域 区域发展署 回应经济衰退 区域恢復力 地方企业伙伴 在地主义
BAILEY D. et BERKELEY N. Les réponses régionales à la récession économique: le rôle du West Midlands Regional Taskforce,
Regional Studies. Des groupes de travail régionaux ont été créés à travers les régions d’Angleterre à la ﬁn de l’année 2008 en
réponse à la recession la plus profonde depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cet article examine le rôle d’un tel groupe, à
savoir le West Midlands Regional Taskforce, comme étude de cas des réponses régionales à la récession, et fournit des leçons
éventuelles à en tirer pour aborder de telles situations à l’avenir. Ce faisant, il s’interroge sur la notion de ‘capacité d’adaptation’
régionale et son importance pour ce qui est des actions politiques à l’échelle régionale. Comprendre comment la région a
répondu de cette façon pourrait aider à assurer une ‘capacité permanente’ pour affronter les chocs, surtout dans le cadre de la
suppression des agences de développement régional (regional development agencies; RDAs) en Angleterre à partir de 2012
et de leur remplacement par les partenariats locaux d’entreprise (local enterprise partnerships; LEPs).
Régions d’Angleterre Agences de développement régional Réponses à la récession Capacité d’adaptation régionale
Partenariats locaux d’entreprise Localisme
BAILEY D. und BERKELEY N. Regionale Reaktionen auf die Rezession: die Rolle der West Midlands Regional Taskforce,
Regional Studies. Als Reaktion auf die schwerste Rezession seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wurden Ende 2008 in sämtlichen
englischen Regionen regionale Arbeitsgruppen eingerichtet. In diesem Beitrag wird als Beispiel für die regionalen Reaktionen
Regional Studies, 2014
Vol. 48, No. 11, 1797–1812, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2014.893056
© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article. Non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly attributed,
cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way, is permitted. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
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auf die Rezession die Rolle von einem dieser Gremien – der West Midlands Regional Taskforce – untersucht, und es werden die
potenziellen Lehren für die Zukunft beim Umgang mit solchen Situationen erörtert. Hierbei untersuchen wir das umstrittene
Konzept der regionalen ‘Resilienz’ und seiner Relevanz für politische Maßnahmen auf regionaler Ebene. Ein Verständnis der
Art und Weise, in der die Region reagierte, könnte zum Erhalt einer ‘permanenten Kapazität’ zum Umgang mit Schocks beitra-
gen, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der Abschaffung der regionalen Entwicklungsagenturen (RDAs) in England seit 2012
und ihrer Ersetzung durch lokale Unternehmenspartnerschaften (LEPs).
Englische Regionen Regionale Entwicklungsagenturen Reaktionen auf die Rezession Regionale Resilienz Lokale
Unternehmenspartnerschaften Lokalismus
BAILEY D. y BERKELEY N. Respuestas regionales a la recesión: el papel del grupo de trabajo deWest Midlands,Regional Studies. En
respuesta a la más grave recesión desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, a ﬁnales de 2008 se crearon grupos de trabajo regionales por
todas las regiones de Inglaterra. En este artículo analizamos el papel de uno de estos organismos, la West Midlands Regional
Taskforce, como un ejemplo de la respuesta regional a la recesión, que nos sirve de posible enseñanza sobre cómo tratar estas
situaciones en el futuro. De este modo, reﬂexionamos sobre el concepto cuestionado de ‘resiliencia’ regional y su importancia
para las medidas políticas de ámbito regional. Si entendemos cómo se respondió en la región, podemos ayudar a mantener una
‘capacidad permanente’ de tratar con los choques, especialmente en el contexto de la abolición de las agencias de desarrollo regional
en Inglaterra de 2012 y su sustitución por la cooperación empresarial local.
Regiones inglesas Agencias de desarrollo regional Respuestas a la recesión Resiliencia regional Cooperación empre-
sarial local Localismo
JEL classiﬁcations: L98, R11, R50, R58
INTRODUCTION
Regional taskforces were set up throughout the English
regions in late 2008 in response to the most severe reces-
sion since the Second World War. The taskforce
approach offered an opportunity to focus minds,
enable strategic overview of limited resources and
target interventions. The West Midlands Taskforce
(WMTF) had two main aims: to address the speciﬁc
regional business and employment issues associated
with the downturn, trying to minimize their impact
on businesses and communities; and to ensure business
‘resilience’ in the region over the longer-term. This
paper examines the role of the WMTF as an example
of regional response to recession, and offers potential
lessons for the future in dealing with such situations.
In so doing it reﬂects on the contested concept of
regional ‘resilience’ and its relevance for policy actions
at the regional level. Understanding how the region
responded in this way could help in maintaining some
sort of ‘permanent capacity’ (BAILEY et al., 2012; PIKE
et al., 2010) to deal with shocks, especially in the
context of the abolition of regional development
agencies (RDAs) in England from 2012.
The paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst section
considers the nature of the recession in the UK, its
overall impact and the role of sub-national actors in
dealing with the impact. The second section examines
the concept of regional resilience as a framework for
understanding how well regions are placed to respond
to external shocks and how policy might contribute to
fostering forms of ‘resilience’. The third section uses
the West Midlands region as case study to examine
the effect of the recession and the subsequent work of
the taskforce in attempting to mitigate its impact. The
fourth section presents some reﬂections on theory and
policy implications, linking back to concepts of
resilience.
RECESSION IMPACT AND SUB-NATIONAL
RESPONSES
The 2008–09 (and more recent) economic crisis had a
different character to previous recessions, being
marked by its depth and prolonged duration, its reach
and inﬂuence, and by the structural implications it has
had for ﬁnancial systems and investment (ORGANIS-
ATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 2009). The downturn also
accelerated some of the key processes of structural
change that were already in progress (manufacturing
employment decline, for example) in so-called
‘mature’ UK manufacturing regions such as the West
Midlands. Uncertainty over the spatial impact of the
recession and credit crunch added to the challenge
facing agencies such as RDAs, and required leadership
at different scales (nationally, regionally and locally).
Yet the crisis added to the urgency to address issues
such as higher and more deeply rooted unemployment
and worklessness, business failures, home repossessions
and the wider social impact of the downturn. The
downturn also left the UK in an indebted position,
meaning that the West Midlands region, like others,
has had to focus on delivering maximum economic
beneﬁts from increasingly scarce public sector resources,
especially in the context of an austere ﬁscal position
since the 2010 Budget (HM TREASURY, 2010).
On a more positive note, PARKINSON et al. (2009)
noted some potentially positive impacts of the recession
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and credit crunch, including opportunities for reﬂection
and planning for long-term development and the pro-
motion of sustainable regeneration. Similarly, at a local
level, the survey by the IMPROVEMENT & DEVELOP-
MENT AGENCY (I&DEA) and LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ASSOCIATION (LGA) (2008) found that nearly a half
of local authorities declared that the economic slow-
down presented them with new opportunities to form
or improve partnership working. Such different roles
for various levels of government in responding to the
recession was also emphasized by The Work Foun-
dation (BRINKLEY et al., 2008). This research high-
lighted a range of possible sub-national interventions
to attempt to address the recession, noting that the
recession was likely to affect places in different ways.
This work suggested that local and regional actors
were best placed to deal with the impacts on the sub-
national economy due to their deeper understanding
of the issues, e.g. with interventions supporting small
and medium-sized ﬁrms under pressure through loan
schemes and advice or using the public sector as a tool
to stabilize the economy through its role as an employer
(BRINKLEY et al., 2008).
Similarly, drawing on international case studies, the
OECD Local Economic and Employment Develop-
ment (LEED) Programme noted that the capacity to
draw-up, and effectively implement, sound regional/
local economic strategies may not be common
(OECD, 2009). The economic crisis was in this sense
an opportunity to reﬁne existing efforts, and to
enhance capacity and competence development
(CLARK and HUXLEY, 2011). It was argued that this
could also give rise to a better diagnostic assessment of
regional and local economic assets and advantages, and
lead to more robust strategy assessment, development
and delivery. This would seem to have been a key
role for the regional taskforces in England. The regional
level is especially pertinent here as economic develop-
ment is often led or facilitated by local governments,
but is often not a task to which local governments are
well suited (OECD, 2009). As the OECD noted, econ-
omic development is often a more ‘market-facing’
activity that operates over longer time frames, broader
geographies, and wider institutional collaborations
than is usual for local government. In this regards, the
regional scale – and a regional response –may be critical.
Economic development can be seen in this way as a
‘specialist “vision driven”’ activity, that seeks to deﬁne
a strategic path into the future and to shape the behav-
iour of other actors, many of whom are not under the
control of local governments leaders (OECD, 2009).
THE RELEVANCE OF ‘RESILIENCE’?
Academic interest in the impact of economic shocks and
crises on local and regional economies has given rise to
debates concerning regional resilience (HILL et al., 2008;
SIMMIE and MARTIN, 2010). HILL et al. (2008,
pp. 4–5), for example, conceptualize regional economic
resilience in a narrow sense as the ‘ability of a region to
recover from shocks to its economy that either throw it
off its growth path or have the potential to throw it off
its growth path but do not actually do so’. They contend
that regional economies may be thrown off their
‘growth path’ as a result of structural economic
changes or external ‘shocks’ such as natural disasters,
plant closures or economic recession. Furthermore,
SIMMIE and MARTIN (2010) argue that the notion of
resilience should also consider the degree of resistance
to such a shock on the premise that this will have a pro-
found effect on a region’s ability to recover and recover
quickly. Their thesis links regional economic resilience
to the adaptive capacity of an economy (the ability of
a region structures to adapt to the changing external
and internal pressures that confront its ﬁrms and work-
force) set within an evolutionary framework. They
suggest that resilience and adaptability can be inﬂu-
enced, for example, by ‘variety’ in an economy; in
this sense sectoral variety and the degree of industrial
specialization or diversiﬁcation. Regions with strong
sector dependency are likely to be more prone to
sector-speciﬁc shocks to their economy and at the
same time lack the diversiﬁcation of activity to
dampen or mitigate the shock. Less sector-dependent
and hence less vulnerable regions may be able to avoid
shocks altogether, or at least dampen their effects, thus
minimizing negative effects on measures such as
output and unemployment (HILL et al., 2008). Variety
might also take the form of ﬁrm behaviour with more
resilient regions having more adaptable, innovative
ﬁrms (SIMMIE and MARTIN, 2010).
Similarly, HILL et al. (2008) link economic resilience
to innovation, diversiﬁcation and human capital, whilst
suggesting that it may be negatively inﬂuenced where
economies and their infrastructures are dominated by a
small number of large ﬁrms. SIMMIE and MARTIN
(2010) take the economic resilience debate further by
adopting the concept of ‘panarchy’ in which a regional
economy is seen in a complex adaptive cycle where resi-
lience varies over time. The cycle is characterized by two
loops: one where a particular economic structure and
growth path emerges, develops and stabilizes (resilience
is high); the other where rigidity and decline set in (resi-
lience declines) and new activities and sources of growth
are subsequently created (resilience increases). More-
over, they suggest that over time regional economic resi-
lience is inﬂuenced both by longer-term, region-wide
processes (e.g. local government and education) and
shorter-term micro-scale processes (ﬁrm behaviour)
and how these interrelate. This in turn links to broader
perspectives on resilience in terms of evolutionary
approaches (PIKE et al., 2010). This evolutionary
approach is taken further by MARTIN (2012), who
links the concept of resilience to hysteresis. In so doing
he explores four dimensions of regional resilience:
Regional Responses to Recession: The Role of the West Midlands Regional Taskforce 1799
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resistance (the degree of sensitivity or depth of reaction
to a recessionary shock); recovery (the speed and
degree of recovery from a recessionary shock); reorienta-
tion (the extent of reorientation and adaption in
response to recessionary shock); and renewal (the
extent to which the regional economy renews its
growth path, whether a pre-recession path or hysteretic
shift to a new path).
These (contested) concepts of economic resilience
provide some useful theoretical tools in which to con-
textualize the work of the WMRT in responding to
recession, and some associated questions. Firstly, to
what extent was the region vulnerable to this external
economic shock? Secondly, how did the region’s rela-
tive resilience affect the impact that the taskforce
could have in dampening or mitigating the negative
effects of the recession on key economic indicators
such as output and unemployment? Thirdly, to what
extent did the taskforce – and the RDA more generally
– improve regional resilience? Whilst deﬁnitive answers
to such questions cannot be provided, the following sec-
tions begin to frame some responses by examining the
work of the taskforce and the RDA. Firstly, though,
the paper examines the impact of the recession on the
region.
THE IMPACT OF THE RECESSION ON THE
WEST MIDLANDS REGION
Heading into the recession the West Midlands as a
‘mature industrial region’ displayed typical hallmarks
of vulnerability: a weak industrial structure linked to
longstanding sectoral dependency (i.e. a lack of
variety), poor economic growth (measured in both
employment and gross value added – GVA), and rela-
tively low skills and levels of innovation compared
with other regions (WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL
OBSERVATORY (WMRO), 2010). This would
suggest that the region would be less resilient to the
recession than other regions and might struggle to
adapt and recover quickly. At the same time there
were some positive signs: exemplar ﬁrms within
premium brands and emerging higher value technol-
ogies (including low carbon vehicles); a high-quality
engineering services sector well integrated with the
premium brands; strong research and development
(R&D) facilities at leading ﬁrms; and a supportive
public sector with experience of dealing with previous
economic shocks (WMRO, 2010). So how did the
recession impact on the region?
Analysis by CLAYTON (2009) stressed that the areas
seeing the largest increases in the numbers of people
claiming unemployment beneﬁts during the recession
were the ‘core cities’ of the North, the West Midlands
and Scotland, plus other areas linked with traditional
manufacturing and heavy industry that also suffered dis-
proportionately in previous recessions. Work by
FOTHERGILL (2009) reported a similar picture.
The differential impact of the recession on the West
Midlands region was highlighted by Purchasing Man-
agers’ Index (PMI) data, which showed, for example,
that by February 2009 the West Midlands had con-
tracted at a more rapid pace than other UK regions.
As the year progressed, the contraction of the West
Midlands economy slowed. Yet by June 2009 the
PMI data showed the worse downturn in output for
the West Midlands out of the UK regions (Fig. 1).
The severity of the regional impact was linked to the
sectoral composition of the region, with over 50% of
regional economic activity derived from manufacturing
(notably automotive and metals), real estate, and whole-
sale and retail trade, all of which were badly hit by the
recession.
Fig. 1. Purchasing managers index: output, 2008–10, seasonally adjusted
Source: MARKIT (2010)
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This is reinforced by data from a shift–share analysis1
(Table 1) that reveal how the region suffered in terms of
employment growth in the ﬁve years before the ﬁnan-
cial crisis and recession hitting (i.e. 2003–08) because it
had an industrial mix that was not favourable to growth.
The dominance of nationally declining industries such as
manufacturing was reﬂected in the region’s negative
‘industry mix’. At the same time the region’s industries
were seen to be less competitive, underperforming in
growth sectors such as ﬁnancial services, as well as per-
forming worse in declining sectors such as manufactur-
ing (as shown in negative ‘regional shift’). The
performance of these sectors was slightly offset by stron-
ger growth in construction, retail and transport sectors
than was observed nationally. Overall though employ-
ment grew by 1% in the region between 2003 and
2008 compared with the national economy which
grew at 4%. The overreliance on manufacturing was
problematic given the 23% decline in (nominal) regional
manufacturing GVA over 1997–2009 – more than any
other UK region (OFFICE FOR NATIONAL STATISTICS
(ONS), 2011).
With the arrival of the recession, between Q2 2008
and Q2 2010, some 50000 manufacturing workforce
jobs were lost, with another 35000 in wholesale/retail
trades (BERKELEY et al., 2011). The rapid downturn
in the automotive industry (with sales down by 30%
in March 2009 year-on-year and production down by
some 60% in Q1 2009) was especially pertinent in this
regard.
Given this context it is perhaps not surprising that the
West Midlands saw a more rapid increase in unemploy-
ment than other English regions during 2008 and the
ﬁrst half of 2009 (Table 2). Indeed, in the 18 months
to June 2009 unemployment in the region increased
by 4.7 percentage points. Other measures are equally
revealing. In the year to June 2009 the number of
vacancies available in the region fell by 39% – the
fourth worst performance of the ten UK regions;
whilst the redundancy rate in the region in Q2 2009
stood at 15.9 per 1000 employees – the highest rate of
any region and an increase of 10/1000 employees on
the previous year. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
number employed in the region fell by some 2.5% in
the year to February–April 2009. This again was the
worst performance of any English region.
In fact, the recession exposed some the West Mid-
land’s long running socio-economic weaknesses.
Indeed since the late 1970s the region had experienced
a consistent worsening of its economic performance (as
evidenced by employment and gross domestic product
(GDP) growth) relative to the national position (see
Table 1. Shift–share analysis for the West Midlands region, 2003–08 (benchmark = Great Britain)
West Midlands employment
Industry 2003 2008 Change National share Industry mix Regional shift
Agriculture and mining 20500 26000 5500 770 2333 2370
Energy and water supply 13000 11800 –1200 488 –1200 –525
Manufacturing 416400 324600 –91800 15654 –82758 –24736
Construction 101200 114800 13600 3805 7833 1925
Distribution, hotels and restaurants 552200 556400 4200 15760 –31090 6622
Transport, storage and communication 129500 137300 7800 4869 –4330 7290
Banking, ﬁnance and insurance 381400 439100 57700 2595 –3205 –3502
Public administration, education and health 597300 636900 39600 4423 –2013 941
Other service activities 111300 108500 –2800 4183 1820 –8733
Total 2322700 2355400 32600 87320 –32766 –21948
Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) data, Annual Business Inquiry Employee Analysis.
Table 2. Six-month change in unemployment rates (p.p. all persons aged 16+ and over)
Region
Six months to
June 2008
Six months to
December 2008
Six months
to June 2009
Cumulative
18-month change
North East 0.6 0.9 1.5 3.0
North West 1.8 1.4 0.8 4.0
Yorkshire/Humber 0.7 0.6 2.2 3.5
East Midlands 0.3 0.7 1.0 2.0
West Midlands 0.3 1.8 2.6 4.7
East 0.2 0.9 0.9 2.0
London 0.0 0.6 1.6 2.2
South East –0.3 0.9 0.8 1.4
South West 0.1 1.0 1.6 2.7
Wales 0.1 1.9 0.7 2.7
Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) Regional Trends 2010/11.
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also MARTIN, 2009). For example, by 2007 employ-
ment in the region had grown just 9 percentage points
from its 1971 level. This compares with growth of 18
percentage points for Yorkshire and the Humber, 35
percentage points for the East Midlands, 46 percentage
points for the East, and 48 percentage points for the
South East. Only the North East and the North West
fared worse than the West Midlands (MARTIN, 2009).
Output per head (GVA) in the region had lagged
behind since the 1970s and by 2008 was just 84% of
the UK average. The output gap had widened consider-
ably since the mid-1990s when it was around £4 billion
to a position in 2008 of some £16 billion (WMRO,
2010).
The underlying reasons for this may include, inter
alia: a long-term underinvestment in infrastructure; an
ongoing process of deindustrialization and a wider econ-
omic structure reliant on low volume, low growth
sectors; a relatively poor business and employment per-
formance in the private sector; a relatively poor edu-
cation and skills record; relatively poor performance in
developing ‘knowledge economy’ sectors and in R&D
spend; and pockets of high levels of unemployment
and worklessness (BAILEY and DE PROPRIS, 2009).
The rapid rise in unemployment in the region during
the downturn was not unusual. Unemployment in the
West Midlands has tended to ‘peak’ at higher levels
during recent recessions, but has then tended to fall
back to around the national average (Fig. 2). This was
most marked during the 1980s (which was primarily a
manufacturing recession linked to overvaluation of ster-
ling and tight monetary policy). This is linked to the
speed with which manufacturing demand and output
can be scaled back in a recession and how the stock
cycle can amplify trends, with the effect that regions
where manufacturing is signiﬁcant tend to see a more
rapid fall in orders and output. However, since the
late 1990s regional unemployment has not returned to
the national average after recession; rather the gap
between national and regional unemployment rates
tended to widen. So, both in terms of output and
unemployment, the relative position of the West Mid-
lands in relation to other UK regions has deteriorated
over time.
It is against this recent historical background and
differential regional impact that the regional taskforces
had to work. Looking ahead, it was feared that
regionally the recession could lead to long-term
damage in terms of productive capacity being perma-
nently lost, the scrapping of capital, a structural as well
as cyclical fall-off in GDP, workers withdrawing
labour permanently, a rise in youth unemployment
and consequent concerns over a ‘lost generation’,
the potential for a ‘structural’ labour deﬁcit, and the
possibility of ‘jobless growth’ (BAILEY and BERKE-
LEY, 2010).
Interestingly, however, data from the Ofﬁce for
National Statistics (ONS) show evidence of recovery
in the region as one form of ‘resilience’. Whilst the
West Midlands had the largest percentage point increase
in unemployment in the 18 months to June 2009, it
then exhibited the strongest recovery, a reduction in
the unemployment rate of 2.3 percentage points in
the 12 months between June 2009 and June 2010.
These data are reinforced by unemployment count
ﬁgures that again showed the region as having the stron-
gest recovery in the year to February–April 2010, having
had the highest increase in the previous 12 months.
Similarly, in terms of vacancies, the West Midlands
was the only region to recover to the 2008 level of
vacancies immediately prior to the recession, with a
60% increase in the year to 2010 (ONS, 2011). The
next section of the paper examines the role that the
West Midlands Regional Taskforce may have played
in this process.
THE WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL
TASKFORCE
It is important to note that regional intervention was
part of a wider national response with central
Fig. 2. Regional claimant counts during recessions
Source: Advantage West Midlands Strategy Team (WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL OBSERVATORY (WMRO), 2009)
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government intervention seen as critical early on in
order to stabilize and ‘protect’ the economy and
support key business sectors. The Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) launched a series
of short-term initiatives, with up to £20 billion of
direct support to UK businesses (for a summary of
initiatives, see Table 3).
Although central government played a role in pro-
viding a framework for supporting businesses, the
impact of recession differed spatially, and as such local
and regional actors were seen as best placed to respond
due to their local sensitivity and deeper understanding
of the issues that are speciﬁc to individual ﬁrms,
sectors and locations (BRINKLEY et al., 2008). Moreover
as the COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN MUNICIPALITIES AND
REGIONS (CEMR) (2009) concluded in its second
survey in late 2009, ‘“good local [and regional] govern-
ance” is crucial in alleviating the local impacts of a larger
crisis’ (p. 8). As such from late 2008 the UK government
worked with the then RDAs to rollout regionally tai-
lored support through taskforces. They were established
as an opportunity to focus minds, enable a strategic
overview of limited resources and to target interventions
during the recession.
The WMTF was convened with two principal aims:
to address speciﬁc regional business and employment
issues; and to ensure business ‘resilience’ in the West
Midlands over the long-term. The term ‘resilience’
was not tightly deﬁned here, although interviews
suggest it encompassed both short-term priorities
relating to the resistance and recovery dimensions of
resilience along with longer-term dimensions of reor-
ientation and renewal. Not surprisingly, short-term
goals took priority: ‘without a short-term we don’t
have a long-term’, one interviewee noted.
The taskforce was chaired by the then regional
minister and supported by the RDA Advantage
West Midlands (AWM), which was able to draw
upon the experience of dealing with previous crises,
not least the closure of the Rover car manufacturing
plant at Longbridge, Birmingham, in 2005. AWM
coordinated the support of regional partners on
behalf of the taskforce, and allocated £5 million of
its core budget to support interventions, helping to
lever additional European Regional Development
Fund monies of approximately £4 million. Funding
was primarily used to support the following
initiatives:
. Gathering and assimilation of market intelligence to
inform interventions.
. Enhanced business support services including loans
and grant schemes for SMEs and strategically impor-
tant sectors.
. Development and delivery of a dedicated graduate
internship programme and support for independent
retailers in market towns.
. Regional communications campaigns including the
launch of a dedicated one-stop website for business
advice.
Table 3. Summary of central government support schemes for businesses during the 2008–09 recession
Support scheme Why the scheme was required Details of the support measures included
Improving businesses
access to ﬁnance
Enterprise Finance
Guarantee
Limited access to ﬁnance by small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) due to lack of collateral
£1 billion of loan guarantees to help SMEs access bank lending to
ﬁnance working capital and investment
Working Capital Banks unable to offer sufﬁcient lending to viable
businesses
£10 billion of loan guarantees to banks to release regulatory
capital for new lending
Trade Credit
Insurance
Increased exposure to customer default Up to £5 billion in credit insurance top-up cover
Capital for Enterprise
Fund
Inability to access additional ﬁnance £50 million to enable businesses to restructure ﬁnances and invest
Support to the automotive
sector
Automotive Assistance
Programme
Lack of access to credit and ﬁnance for investment
within the automotive sector
£2.3 billion to cover bank loans to the sector to ensure ongoing
investment in research and developing low carbon technologies
Vehicle Scrappage Sharp falls in consumer demand £400 million (matched by industry) to stimulate consumer
demand
Indirect support at the
regional level
Business Payment
Support Service
Shortages of working capital amongst SMEs Businesses able to negotiate tax payment options to help with
temporary cash ﬂow difﬁculties
Business Rate Deferral Option for businesses to defer part of the 5% increase in business
rates
Prompt Payment
Code
Voluntary scheme to encourage businesses to pay suppliers on
time
Source: Adapted from NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) (2010).
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In addition to this funding, the taskforce inﬂuenced
the virement of AWM budgets into priority areas,
and inﬂuenced the prioritization of other partners’
spending.
WMTF brought together leaders from government,
business, regional agencies, local authorities and trades
unions and had 11 key objectives, the majority of
which were focused on supporting business. In line
with guidance produced by central government, activi-
ties were structured around three sources of help: secur-
ing credit and ﬁnance; business management; and
investing for the future (CABINET OFFICE, 2009).
Examples of initiatives that supported businesses in
securing credit and ﬁnance include the Advantage Tran-
sition Bridge Fund (ATBF) (see below); the Enterprise
Finance Guarantee Scheme, which provided working
capital to SMEs; and the Prompt Payment Code
under which public sector organizations pledged to
pay invoices within ten working days. Other initiatives
supporting business management included: a suite of
measures delivered by the ‘Business Link’ business
support network such as a credit crunch hotline.
Finally, in supporting business investment for the
future, initiatives included support for key strategic
sectors, most notably through the Automotive
Response Programme (see below); and a Construction
Industry Action Plan. Alongside these sector speciﬁc
measures, the WMTF monitored performance of a
number of skills and employment related initiatives,
both those that predated the taskforce and those that
stemmed from it, including, for example, Learning
and Skills Council (LSC) national programmes. The
region also launched an innovative Graduate Internship
Programme (see below). In order to guide businesses
through the myriad of schemes and initiatives available,
the WMTF set up a dedicated online resource to sign-
post businesses to sources of support. The range of
initiatives are summarized in Table 4.
ASSESSING THE TASKFORCE RESPONSE
In assessing the impact of the taskforce in achieving its
objectives, the authors undertook a detailed literature
review and evidence-based analysis. In particular, the
methodology used was a mixed-methods approach,
and comprised the following:
. Reviewing the evidence to the House of Commons
Regional Select Committee, its reports and ﬁndings,
and the associated government response.
. Reviewing monitoring data of key WMTF
interventions.
. Discussions and consultations with 24 key WMTF
stakeholders in 2010.
. Case studies of selected interventions, including inter-
views with relevant delivery agencies/bodies.
. Comparisons with the experience of previous reces-
sions drawing on the relevant literature (e.g.
GEROSKI and GREGG, 1997).
. Examination of approaches adopted in other regions
involving a review of the reports of the nine
English regional select committees in their ﬁrst
inquires.
In examining the work of the taskforce, reference is
made to the ‘Barcelona Principles’ identiﬁed by the
OECD LEED Programme (OECD, 2009) and used
by a number of local and regional agencies to inform
their recession response and development planning.
Of these six were identiﬁed as being of particular rel-
evance to the role of regional taskforces: providing lea-
dership; building a robust long-term economic strategy;
providing purposeful short-term support; building long-
term relationships with stakeholders; supporting people
through hardship; and communicating and aligning
with other tiers of government. Reference was also
made to recent work on sub-national responses to
recession and economic shocks (BAILEY et al., 2012;
Table 4. Overview of the West Midlands Taskforce (WMTF) support interventions
Business support theme Key WMTF interventions
Securing credit and ﬁnance
Ensure availability of ﬁnance for business Advantage Transition Bridge Fund (ATBF); Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme; Prompt Payment
Code
Business management
Ensure relevant support is available for all
businesses
Business Link: Credit Crunch Hotline, Workshops and Health-Checks; Local Employment
Partnerships; Rapid Response Service
Provide support for redundant workers Redundancy advice: Citizens Advice Bureau and Job Centre Plus
Signpost support Supportwm.co.uk
Identify and exploit areas of economic
opportunity
Gateway to Global Growth
Investing for the future
Provide support for key strategic sectors Construction Action Plan; Automotive Response Programme; Professionals and Business Services
Action Plan
Retain key skills in the economy Learning and Skills Council: Train to Gain, Pre-redundancy Activity, West Midlands Graduate
Internship Programme
Source: BAILEY and BERKELEY (2010).
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CHAPAIN et al., 2009; THE AUDIT COMMISSION,
2009; DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION
AND SKILLS (BIS), 2013).
Despite the depth and length of the recent recession,
and a worse performance in the region than elsewhere,
ofﬁcial unemployment did not rise as much as initially
feared. As shown in Fig. 3, the recent recession wit-
nessed a greater peak-to-trough fall in GDP (7.4%)
than that observed in the recession of 1980–81 (4.5%),
whilst the increase in ofﬁcial unemployment was less
pronounced than in previous downturns. Indeed, the
rise in unemployment was relatively modest, peaking
at around 2.6 million (Fig. 4) by late 2010. By way of
comparison, the 1980–81 recession saw unemployment
peak at over 3 million.
If unemployment had followed the same pattern as in
the early 1980s’ recession, then it would have been
expected to peak at around 4.2 million and not 2.6
million, or some 1.6 million higher (BERKELEY et al.,
2011). Assuming a share of total national unemployment
in the West Midlands of around 8% at trough (given the
region’s size as a proportion of national GDP), this would
equate to an additional 128000 people recorded as ofﬁ-
cially unemployed in the region. Four factors might
explain why unemployment has not risen as high as in
previous recessions (BERKELEY et al., 2011). Firstly, it
can be argued that ofﬁcial statistics underestimated true
level of unemployment, even on a Labour Force
Survey (LFS) measure, if people drop out of the labour
market completely. Secondly, there may have been an
increase in young people going to higher education to
avoid a tough labour market, or even an increase in
older workers taking early retirement. Thirdly, there
was more labour market ﬂexibility in the sense that
Fig. 3. Change in UK gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1981, 1991 and 2009 recessions
Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) data, National Accounts (ABMI), 2012
Fig. 4. Change in unemployment in the 1981, 1991 and 2009 recessions
Source: Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) data, Labour Force Survey (MGSX), 2012
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ﬁrms tried to retain skilled staff and hence avoid unem-
ployment by cutting back on hours (part-time
working) and imposing wage freezes or cuts. Fourthly,
there was a substantial easing of monetary and ﬁscal
policy to offset the downturn, along with signiﬁcant
regional interventions, including that in West Midlands.
While it is impossible to attribute ﬁgures precisely to the
work of theWMTF, it can be estimated from evaluating
key taskforce interventions that just two – the ATBF and
the Manufacturing Advisory Service Automotive
Response Programme – safeguarded or created some
5900 jobs. This does suggest a small but signiﬁcant econ-
omic impact from the taskforce’s work in terms of
the resistance dimension of building resilience. It is to
these interventions that the paper turns next. These are
highlighted as characteristic of the WMTF’s wider
interventions.
Advantage Transition Bridge Fund (ATBF)
The deteriorating ﬁnancial situation in 2008 led the
UK government to announce a number of interven-
tions in its Pre-Budget Report. This included the
launch of several loan funds by RDAs, based on the
model developed by AWM in response to the earlier
MG Rover collapse. One of these, the Transition
Loan Fund (TLF) illustrates how government refo-
cused existing resources to address the threat posed
by recession and provide support to businesses in secur-
ing credit and ﬁnance at a regional level. In the West
Midlands the TLF was launched as the ATBF, and
was designed to be a temporary ‘lender of last resort’
for SMEs that had exhausted so-called ‘traditional’
routes of ﬁnance. Loans were offered from £50000
to £250000 on a maximum repayment period of
three years and at a commercial rate of interest
(CABINET OFFICE, 2009). The ATBF also had ﬂexi-
bility through the ability to recycle funds through
loan repayments. That allowed the fund to operate
more effectively over its lifetime. AWM was the ﬁrst
RDA to launch a TLF in November 2008, and
given its experience also subsequently administered
the fund for the East Midlands. The AWM scheme
was the second largest amongst the English regions,
and by January 2010 it had awarded the largest
amount of funding, some £10.6 million, and had safe-
guarded around 2500 jobs (BAILEY and BERKELEY,
2010). At a cost (before returns on loans made) of
around £4400 per job safeguarded, the outlay to the
Exchequer was effectively returned within six months.
Over half of the value of loansmadewas allocated to stra-
tegically important sectors in the region such as automo-
tive (32%), business services (15%) and construction (6%).
The ATBF thus backed up sector-speciﬁc support pro-
vided by the WMTF, an example of which, the Manu-
facturing Advisory Service Automotive Response
Programme, is outlined next.
Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS) Automotive Response
Programme (ARP)
Support for the automotive sector within the West
Midlands region was seen as critical given its strategic
importance and the fact that it experienced one of the
most severe downturns in its history in late 2008. One
initiative was the £4.5 million Manufacturing Advisory
Service (MAS) Automotive Response Programme
(ARP) set up by AWM, which aimed to help safeguard
jobs and sales in the automotive sector by funding stra-
tegic projects focused on ensuring that businesses sur-
vived the recession and emerged stronger and more
competitive. There were two funded elements to the
ARP. First, thorough capability reviews aimed to
provide an industry recognized statement that a
company was robust enough to be considered a ‘long
term automotive supplier’. The second element was a
grant to fund consultancy work on strategic projects
related to, for example, diversiﬁcation and reorienta-
tion/restructuring. MAS employed intelligence from
the long-established regionally funded Accelerate pro-
gramme in targeting key parts of the supply chain for
support, and was able to provide speedy support to
assist ﬁrms with diversiﬁcation and other needs. The
ARP was ‘strategic’ in that a key sector was targeted
and key objectives (notably diversiﬁcation) accounted
for much of the support provided.
As at April 2010, ARP had assisted 198 ﬁrms, 82% of
which were SMEs, with some 330 capability reviews
completed. The target for jobs safeguarded was 500,
but this was exceeded considerably, with ﬁgures from
ﬁrms conﬁrming some 2930 jobs safeguarded and 410
jobs created by March 2010 (BAILEY and BERKELEY,
2010). On a spend of £4.5 million, these ﬁgures give
a cost per job safeguarded/created of £1350. Overall,
this can be seen as a rapid and cost-effective intervention
that prevented a further hollowing out of jobs and
capacity in the automotive sector. In terms of sales,
some £53 million was estimated to have been safe-
guarded, and £36 million worth created (BAILEY and
BERKELEY, 2010). While these short-term dimensions
of resistance and recovery were highlighted by policy-
makers in relation to this programme, practitioners
and advisors delivering it – along with some of the
client ﬁrms – emphasized the reorientation and
renewal dimensions in that the support helped them
diversify and shift away from long-standing activities.
Indeed, the scheme focused only on viable ﬁrms with
the capacity to upgrade and diversify, recognizing that
lower value added and less ‘strategic’ capacity may
well be lost.
It is worth noting that the cost per job safeguarded/
created ﬁgures for both ATBF and MAS are low by
comparison with other interventions. For example,
the most recent analysis of the (English) Regional
Growth Fund by the NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE
(NAO) (2012) suggests an average cost per net job
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created as £33000, whilst the ‘old’ RDAs performed at
£28000. In contrast, ﬁgures for ATBF and MAS are per
gross job created, so will anyway be lower. Moreover,
these initiatives were part of a much smaller, regionally
based intervention. Being small scale, targeted and
highly selective, costs were likely to be much lower
than nationally based schemes.
West Midlands Graduate Internship Programme (WMGI)
A third intervention, developed in response to the econ-
omic downturn by a partnership of regional players, the
West Midlands Graduate Internship Programme
(WMGI), built on a portfolio of pre-existing placement
services, but represented an innovative ‘West Midlands’
approach to addressing concerns over graduate opportu-
nities in the region. With the increasing focus on, and
importance of, high-level skills, retention of graduates
within the regional labour market has been seen as a
key issue. In line with this, by providing placements in
regional SMEs, the scheme sought to offer graduates
an opportunity to improve their medium- to longer-
term job prospects through enhancement of both
generic ‘employability’ skills and technical work-based
skills. By doing this, WMGI focused on two key aims:
to help small businesses through the recession and to
prepare for the upturn; and to improve the employabil-
ity of graduates and ultimately retain their high level
skills within the region.
The programme was funded through the WMTF
(initially £220000) and matched the needs of employers
for short-term capacity (at no additional cost) with the
needs of graduates for opportunities to enhance their
employability. Taskforce funding was employed to
provide the brokerage service. Placements were
unpaid and varied in length from a few weeks to six
months. This was important in providing employers
with a ﬂexible and cost-effective solution. Initially the
programme was contracted to deliver 250 graduate
internships. However, due to the high level of
demand from both employers and graduates, this was
extended to 500, backed by an additional £220000.
By mid-February 2010, 1000 graduates had registered
for the scheme with total of 886 enquiries received
from employers. Over 400 graduates had been
matched to internship briefs with 252 starting on place-
ments, 29% of whom were returners to the region. By
this time, one in every 24 placements had led to a
new job being created.
The WMGI programme can be viewed as a success-
ful initiative in a relatively short time scale, helped by
the credibility of the partnership of stakeholders to
inﬂuence decisions and make things happen quickly.
At a total cost of £440000, some 500 internships
were ultimately brokered, at a cost per internship of
just £880. On a ‘conversion rate’ to jobs of 24:1,
this gives a cost per direct job created of £21120,
but at the ﬁnal target conversion rate of 10:1, this
falls to £8800 per direct job created. However, this
is likely to understate considerably the beneﬁts to the
region of the scheme as graduates having held intern-
ships may well be more likely to remain and ﬁnd per-
manent employment. So again while resistance and
recovery were emphasized by policy-makers, there
was a longer-term beneﬁt potentially in terms of
higher skilled workers remaining in the region and a
longer-term renewal.
An analysis of Regional Select Committee Reports
and other regional-level policy documents2 was under-
taken to compare the response to the downturn in the
West Midlands with that in other English regions
(East Midlands, North East, North West, Yorkshire
and Humberside, and the South West). It should be
borne in mind that the Select Committee reports
varied in both focus and content. Even where the
reports were centred on the recession, points of empha-
sis differed. Set in the context of these caveats the analy-
sis of responses in other regions reveals that broadly
there was consistency in approach with a degree of
regional focus and emphasis around local concerns
(Table 5). In the North West, for example, there was
a focus upon supporting individuals through an ‘Indi-
vidual Offer’, covering, for example, those at risk of
redundancy (Rapid Response), newly redundant indi-
viduals, the workless and long-term unemployed; as
well as supporting businesses, utilizing a range of
similar initiatives to the West Midlands, such as Local
Employment Partnerships, the Enterprise Finance
Guarantee Scheme and the TLF. There was also a pro-
gramme of coordinated action focused on graduate
employment, as well as joint working between Business
Link support services and banks to increase dialogue
with local businesses. In Yorkshire and the Humber
initiatives included: a local enhancement of Train to
Gain; ‘Responding to Redundancies’, the Enterprise
Finance Guarantee Scheme and the TLF, Business
Health Checks, increasing the MAS intervention rate,
providing mentoring support to SMEs, and unlocking
stalled capital projects.
Such intervention was typical of cities and regions
globally. CLARK and HUXLEY (2011) in their work
on the Barcelona Principles in practice, and drawing
on examples from 21 cities worldwide, highlighted
how schemes were consistently initiated to support vul-
nerable individuals, target support for SMEs and bring
forward strategically important projects through public
and private ﬁnance. Examples include: a redundancy
hotline in Auckland; a Mobility Centre in Amsterdam
to redirect unemployed to sectors with skills shortages;
retraining redundant workers to start new businesses in
New York; a Company Aid Hotline, Enterprise Aid
Unit and emergency fund to support struggling SMEs
in Hamburg; a Regional Guarantee Fund facilitating
access to credit for SMEs in the Piedmont region; and
a €280 million public investment programme in
Barcelona.
Regional Responses to Recession: The Role of the West Midlands Regional Taskforce 1807
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
an
ch
es
ter
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
5:0
9 0
5 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
Table 5. Summary of responses in other regions.
East Midlands North East North West Yorkshire South West
Transition Loan Fund (TLF) Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme Focused support for individuals at
risk of redundancy
Skills: Enhancement of Train to Gain Business Loan Fund
Range of sustainable development
initiatives: Eco-visitor centre; Genesis
Social Enterprise Centre; Supplier
Diversity East Midlands
Extra funding into the Grants for
Business Investment initiative;
extension of the TLF; additional
funding into business-led
collaborative large company research
and development (R&D) scheme
Business stabilization measures:
Local Employment Partnerships;
and additional support for
employers to employ
individuals with more
challenging circumstances
Economic Inclusion: Responding to
Redundancies (R2R)
Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme
Survive and Thrive business support events Large-scale redundancy groups Future Jobs Fund Enterprise/Access to Finance: TLF;
Safeguarding Jobs in Viable Businesses
Trade Credit Insurance Top-up
Scheme
Single Programme Grant in Aid (allowing
the East Midlands Development
Agency (EMDA) to be ﬂexible in its
approach)
Coordinated action between
universities and the Learning
and Skills Council (LSC)
around graduate employment
Competitiveness: Business Financial
Health Checks (FHCs); increasing the
Manufacturing Advisory Service
(MAS) intervention rate; mentoring
support to manufacturing SMEs
Future Jobs Fund
Route to Market programme: supporting
businesses through an intensive ﬁve-
day workshop covering business
strategy, customer retention, sales and
marketing, recruitment and
development, and ﬁnance
Enterprise Finance Guarantee
Scheme
Urban Renaissance: bringing forward
stalled major capital schemes; ﬁscal
stimulus to physical regeneration
projects
Job Centre Plus Rapid Response
Service
Working Capital Scheme Property: bringing forward enabling/de-
risking works
Regional Economic Task Groups:
people, employment and skills;
housing and infrastructure; support
for business; resilience of public
services; green economic recovery
Capital for Enterprise Scheme Local procurement initiatives
Venture Capital Loan Fund Commissioning of a report into ‘green
jobs’ in the region
Support for high-growth
businesses
Focus upon graduate unemployment
by Job Centre Plus and regional
universities
Sources: HOUSE OF COMMONS EAST MIDLANDS REGIONAL COMMITTEE (2009); HOUSE OF COMMONS NORTH EAST REGIONAL COMMITTEE (2009); HOUSE OF COMMONS NORTH WEST
REGIONAL COMMITTEE (2009); HOUSE OF COMMONS SOUTH WEST REGIONAL COMMITTEE (2009); and EKOSGEN (2009).
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POLICY LEARNING
In its regional response to the recession, the WMTF
delivered a number of outcomes, underpinned by a
detailed evidence base, in line with the ‘Barcelona
Principles’ noted above, particularly around leadership,
strategy, targeted short-term support, building relation-
ships with stakeholders and communicating with other
tiers of government. Firstly, the process of data and
intelligence collection and analysis improved markedly
through the taskforce, facilitating a more informed
understanding of the key economic issues affecting
the region. This intelligence was shared widely
within and beyond the agency and helped develop a
genuinely regional consensus on issues. A lasting
legacy of the taskforce (and regional taskforces more
generally) should be in terms of the quality of the
data and intelligence gathering developed and the stra-
tegic use of this.
Secondly, the data and intelligence informed stra-
tegic thinking and direction and enabled AWM to
target key locations (market towns), sectors (automo-
tive, construction) and ﬁrms (SMEs). In so doing, a
degree of consensus was developed around the need
to focus resources. The selection of policies and priori-
ties in this regard became more evidence based and
thus acceptable to a range of parties, again a key
lesson for more general regional level interventions.
Overall, this work triggered a move to more sophisti-
cated way of developing targets for intervention and
policies to get there. The taskforce’s work can be cate-
gorized using the framework used by the AUDIT
COMMISSION (2009) to analyse local responses to the
recession. Interventions such as the Advantage TLF
and the Automotive Response Programme can be
categorized as ‘strategic, creative, active’, whilst the
Graduate Internship Programme and Market Towns
initiative might be described as ‘informed but modest
actions’. The authors found no evidence of ‘limited
analysis’ given the much stronger data and intelligence
developments under the WMTF (Fig. 5).
Thirdly, it should be noted that the taskforce had to
work within the usual constraints of government
activity. Central government agencies often have long
lead-times, and the constraints of silo budgets meant
that the WMTF may have chosen to allocate resources
in a different manner if it had greater ﬂexibility. Never-
theless, a common thread in discussions with key stake-
holders was the ‘success’ of the taskforce in terms of its
speed of response, drawing on past experience. Whilst
other regional taskforces ran similar responses in the
UK, albeit tailored for local conditions, WMTF was
often the front runner; the ATBF, for example, was
the ﬁrst in the country to be set up, drawing upon learn-
ing from the Rover Taskforce experience.
Fourthly, some ‘key asks’ were made by WMTF via
the regional minister to central government. Some such
requests were subsequently acted on by government (e.
g. the ATBF and the Enterprise Finance Guarantee
Scheme) while others (e.g. a part-time wage subsidy
delivered in Wales) were not. The actions undertaken
beneﬁtted other regions as well, and came about
through a ‘bottom up’ process where needs were con-
veyed to central government via the taskforce.
Fifthly, and building upon good practice from the
earlier Rover Taskforce, WMTF signiﬁcantly enhanced
cooperation and partnership working in the region, such
as through intelligence sharing, effective signposting and
joint initiatives – again a key ‘policy lesson’more gener-
ally. Moreover, interviews with stakeholders suggested
that the WMTF had inﬂuence and was able to ‘steer’
member bodies to use resources in certain directions.
Having stakeholder representatives with power and
inﬂuence (including the then regional minister)
proved critical. Certain activities were thus stimulated
by the taskforce which otherwise may not have hap-
pened, or may have otherwise taken longer to
develop. The Construction Action Plan is one such
example – interviews here suggest that the taskforce
helped to focus minds and move things more quickly.
The Graduate Internship Programme is another,
Fig. 5. Audit Commission framework for analysing local responses to recession
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where taskforce members had the power to inﬂuence
decisions and make things happen quickly, as is particu-
larly important where local solutions are being designed
and delivered within complex national frameworks.
Finally, on a more practical level, while noting some
policy successes for the WMTF, there are a number of
policy implications and lessons for such responses in
the future. Firstly, a more inclusive approach by the
taskforce earlier would have been beneﬁcial, in that
some key business representatives were not on the task-
force initially. However, it should be acknowledged that
the regional minister did respond to this and sub-
sequently opened up taskforce membership. Secondly,
the taskforce engaged in relatively modest but intelligent
spend. Signiﬁcantly more resources could potentially
have boosted the economic impact. The ATBF, for
example, was heavily oversubscribed. Thirdly, it
would be helpful if ‘off the shelf’ support packages
could be made available – e.g. in ﬁnance – so as to facili-
tate even speedier action. Fourthly, more strategic tools
for key spending areas would be useful, such as in
relation to the Automotive Response Programme.
Greater regional ﬂexibility would have been helpful in
the circumstances; in some cases the taskforce may
have done things differently if given the ﬂexibility to
do so, as was the case in Wales. There is also a need
to maintain the much improved data and intelligence
base that has been developed under the taskforce,
although this is now unlikely on a regional scale given
the abolition of RDAs noted above. The quality and
robustness of the intelligence was vital in informing stra-
tegic decisions that enabled spend to be directed towards
the most pressing areas. Finally, more generally it is
important to note that there is a need to retain insti-
tutional ‘memory’ and lessons so that local and regional
bodies can ‘hit the ground running’ in a crisis situation
(BIS, 2013). In the West Midlands, key lessons from
the Rover Taskforce were spelt out at the ﬁrst taskforce
meeting, which enabled a speedy response in a number
of areas of work, such as with the TLF.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to address whether this particular regional
intervention helped improve ‘regional resilience’, the
impact of the WMTF on the four dimensions of resili-
ence explored by MARTIN (2012) can be examined. In
terms of ‘resistance’, it is clear that the region took one
of the biggest ‘hits’ of any UK region, being especially
exposed to both the manufacturing and trade downturn.
In this sense, given both the scale of the downturn and
limited resources available, overall the taskforce could
do little to cushion a region yet again exposed to a
major downturn, and indeed this was largely perceived
as a response for the national level given both the cen-
tralized nature of government in England and the
need for macroeconomic stimulus via ﬁscal and
monetary policy. However it should be noted that the
taskforce did, via the regional minister, provide signiﬁ-
cant input into the development of national level
policy, hence could be seen as playing a useful, support-
ing role within a (limited) multilevel governance
framework.
On the dimension of ‘recovery’, however, as noted
above the region has witnessed a more rapid ‘bounce
back’ in terms of forward looking conﬁdence measures
such as the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI), GDP
growth and a fall in unemployment – although
whether the region manages will restore the long-stand-
ing ‘gap’ with national performance is questionable. To
what extent this can be attributed to the role of the
WMTF or wider factors (notably the depreciation of
sterling which has assisted the region’s manufacturers
in terms of exports) is beyond the scope of this paper,
but certain WMTF interventions could be seen as criti-
cal, e.g. in enabling key suppliers in the auto and other
industries to survive and be able to respond more
quickly when the upswing came, in a form of localized
industrial policy that aimed to keep ‘strategic’ supply
chain capacity in place. On the ‘renewal’ dimension of
the resilience concept, taskforce interventions assisted
strategic ﬁrms – e.g. in the auto industry – reorientate
towards higher value activities and to diversify into
related markets such as aerospace. This meant that
ﬁrms attempted to move into markets where the
region was better placed to compete (high value,
niche and low carbon automotive being examples).
The latter has assisted with ‘renewal’ in that this has
enabled something of a shift to a new growth path for
some industries focused on low carbon and higher
value activities.
In this regard, while ‘resilience’ can be seen overall as
a useful term for examining the role and response of
regional interventions in the downturn, the relevance
and value of the term for this particular region and its
response perhaps lies less in the ‘resistance’ and ‘recov-
ery’ dimensions highlighted by policy-makers but
more in terms of ‘reorientation’ and ‘renewal’. In that
sense the WMTF attempted to build on the earlier
efforts of the Rover Taskforces and Regional Economic
Strategy to attempt to promote – in evolutionary terms
– adaptability (PIKE et al., 2010; HASSINK, 2010). Fur-
thermore, these ‘reorientation’ and ‘renewal’ dimen-
sions of ‘resilience’ are in turn better understood in a
broader evolutionary economic geography framework
(BOSCHMA and FRENKEN, 2010). In this sense the
response was again part of broader effort to break free
of a long-standing ‘path dependency’ or ‘lock in’
(HASSINK, 2010). How successful this will be over the
longer-term is not clear but there was a clear effort to
break away from top-down traditional support for
certain sectors – such as auto – towards fostering a
new conﬁguration of related activities. There is a parallel
with city and regional responses across OECD
countries; as CLARK and HUXLEY (2011, p. 286)
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note, local leaders used the crisis ‘to think differently,
accelerate new ways of working, and escape from old
paths that may no longer be useful’. Indeed, such
responses in turn should be put into a broader context
where HUDSON (2010, p. 22) notes that resilient
regions can be viewed as those which try to develop
‘transformative strategies’ that anticipate and prepare
for the effects of adverse changes.
Yet such ‘lessons’ for developing regional capacity to
anticipate and respond to crises need to be set in the
context of a rapidly changing and evolving policy land-
scape. The formation of a coalition government in
2010 marked an abrupt change in English regional
development policy. The key feature of this policy
shift was the decision to abolish English RDAs (with
the exception of that in London). In their place
‘Local Enterprise Partnerships’ (LEPs) have emerged
operating at the sub-regional scale. In the West Mid-
lands, for example, the RDA has been replaced with
six LEPs. Despite this language of ‘localism’,
however, it should be noted that many of the powers
held by English RDAs, for example, on industrial
policy, inward investment, business support and other
policy areas, have been recentralized to London
(HILDRETH and BAILEY, 2013). Moreover, unlike
RDAs, LEPs have to operate without signiﬁcant dedi-
cated budgets. A second issue is how cooperation
between smaller LEPs will actually be enforced, and
how stronger LEPs will be incentivised to cooperate
with weaker LEPs (HILDRETH and BAILEY, 2013).
The need for joint LEP working can also be evidenced
in the regional data and intelligence legacy of the task-
force. Overall, RDAs were often better positioned to
make judgements about how best to offer support
and to which clusters (and/or sectors) as they had a
superior information base than central governments,
as has been highlighted in the case of the West Mid-
lands Regional Taskforce. A key lesson of the taskforce
response, therefore, is that despite the retrenchment of
national-level industrial policy and the shift to the
national scale, there remains a role for regional level
coordination of local (LEP) economic and cluster strat-
egies, most obviously via some sort of intermediate tier
infrastructure.
NOTES
1. Shift–share analysis is a technique used to assess the degree
to which a region’s industry mix explains employment
change within that region.
2. House of Commons Regional Committee reports for East
Midlands, North East, North West and South West; and
Yorkshire Forward’s Recession Response – Monitoring
and Evaluation Framework (EKOSGEN, 2009).
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